Pakistan entered 2026 with an unusual problem for a developing nation: a surplus of liquefied natural gas. Long-term contracts signed during the pandemic, when prices were low, left the country with more gas than it could consume. It was exporting the excess at a profit.
That surplus has evaporated. The Strait of Hormuz disruption has rerouted global LNG shipping, spiked spot prices, and made it economically impossible for Pakistan to maintain its export contracts while keeping domestic supply stable.
The Conversation reported this week that Pakistan now faces a looming energy shortage — not because of insufficient supply, but because the war has restructured the global gas market in ways that turn surpluses into deficits overnight.
Pakistan is not a party to the Iran war. It shares a border with Iran and has maintained a careful neutrality. Its reward for that neutrality is an energy crisis caused by a conflict it actively tried to avoid.
The mechanics are instructive. When a chokepoint like Hormuz is disrupted, the effects are not limited to oil. LNG, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and manufactured goods all flow through the same waterways. Disrupting one disrupts all.
Pakistan’s experience is a preview of what happens to developing economies when great powers go to war near critical infrastructure. The casualties are not only counted in bodies. They are counted in kilowatt-hours, in fertilizer prices, in factories that shut down because the gas stopped flowing.
